Redwolf Luo的回答
贫铀是什么？对人类和环境有哪些影响？
贫铀是一种有毒的重金属，也是铀浓缩的主要副产品。它是当大部分高放射性铀同位素被去除用作核燃料或核武器时留下的物质。贫铀具有与铀相同的化学毒性特性，尽管其放射性毒性较小。
包括世界卫生组织在内的各种国际组织已经就贫铀对人类和环境的潜在影响进行了研究。
联合国原子辐射影响科学委员会（UNSCEAR）继续审查科学文献中关于吸入或摄入铀（包括贫铀）引起的内部暴露对人类影响的最新信息。UNSCEAR得出的结论是，没有发现与贫铀辐射暴露有关的具有临床意义的病理学。
在国际原子能机构（原子能机构）参与的研究中，在观察到贫铀以小颗粒局部污染环境的形式存在的情况下，对公众和环境造成的放射性风险并不显著。
然而，在发现贫铀弹药碎片或完整贫铀弹药的情况下，直接接触这些碎片或弹药的个人有可能受到辐射影响。
以上结论机翻自联合国官网——“Depleted Uranium/贫铀”专页——原文链接见注释[1]。
没时间、没耐心的知友看到这里就够了。
下面的内容都是来自联合国相关机构、组织的更多报告。
其结论与上文无差。
联合国相关机构对贫铀的看法
国际原子能机构
原子能机构在 2008 年、2010 年、2012 年和 2014 年向联合国秘书长汇报了关于使用贫铀武器弹药对人类和环境的影响的研究。原子能机构在收到会员国的请求后，与环境署和世卫组织合作进行这些评估。所涉领土曾受冲突影响。在这些领土上曾使用过贫铀弹药，同时来自这些弹药的残留物依然散布在环境之中，例如在波斯尼亚和黑塞哥维那、塞尔维亚、黑山、科威特和伊拉克。 这些残留物可能以微粒或弹药碎片的形式呈现。原子能机构评估只涉及冲突结束后的平民。原子能机构的报告载于大会 A/63/170、A/65/129、A/67/177 和A/69/151 号报告之中。 在进行这些评估时，首先前往实地采集环境样品，然后对环境样品进行化验，并根据受影响地区民众可能从事的活动会受到何种辐射照射情况作出放射性评估(例如，拥有遭到污染土地、土地的用途、水消耗或能够找到弹药碎片的地区的百姓活动)。原子能机构就科威特和伊拉克的情况编写了出版物《贫铀残留物在科威特地区的放射性情况》(2003 年) 和《伊拉克南部一些地区的贫铀残留物的辐射情况》(2010 年)。 原子能机构在2010年以关于伊拉克南部情况的出版物为成果的评估完成后，就没有再参与任何其他评估。这是由于没有成员国提出要求。 这些出版物以及原子能机构参与其中的其他研究报告(例如，与巴尔干地区冲突后的局势有关的报告)概述的一般性结论是，散布在环境中作为土壤、蔬菜、水和地表的固定污染物观察到的贫铀残留物不会对当地居民构成辐射危害。存在残留物的地区每年产生的辐照量估计仅为几个微西韦特单位，远远低于世界各地居民从自然环境的辐射源得到的辐照量，也大大低于原子能机构建议的用于确定是否需要采取补救行动的辐射参考标准。 不过，所有前述研究表明，大块残片或整发贫铀弹药可能会使直接接触这些放射性物质的人受到严重辐射，比如将这些物品收藏为纪念品人或被贫铀弹药击中的军车作为废铁再用的情况。在这种情况下，建议查明并限制进入可能存在这种残片或整发弹药的地点——通常是受影响的战争装备在冲突结束之后仍留在原地，随后由国家部门进行勘察并将贫铀弹药残留物作为低放射强度废料进行管理。 原子能机构酌情将这些研究报告包括建议提供给受影响区域有权开展进一步调查和进行监测活动的国家当局。原子能机构指出，这些研究只针对冲突后环境中的平民，其结果和结论在进行评估时是有效的。 总而言之，在原子能机构参与的研究中，根据在使用贫铀弹药产生的小颗粒导致环境局部污染所观察到的情况，贫铀对公众和环境造成的辐射风险并不严重。 不过，在发现碎片或整发贫铀弹药的情况下，直接接触这种碎片或弹药的人存在可能受到辐射影响的风险。这种风险可通过国家当局采取收集、储存和处置这些碎片等简单应对措施而加以减轻。 然而，还观察到，在冲突后环境中存留贫铀残留物会进一步增加当地居民的焦虑感，而原子能机构与环境署和世卫组织合作进行的辐射评估结果为所有有关国家提供了让公众放心的依据。
以上文字——原文——摘自2016年联合国第71次会议的《使用贫铀武器弹药的影响-秘书长的报告》中文版，报告编号A/71/139。
联合国环境规划署
联合国原子辐射影响问题科学委员会已全面审查科学文献中有关吸入或摄入铀所产生的内照射对人体影响的最新资料，这是该委员会目前工作方案的一部分。 这项审查将包括天然铀、浓缩铀和贫化铀。审查主要局限于辐射影响，虽然化学毒性显然对人类健康影响很大(贫化铀的化学毒性尤为如此)。 在这方面，该委员会评估了已出版的若干关于可能接触贫化铀的退伍军人的健康影响的研究报告。没有发现与接触贫化铀辐射有关的明显病理异常现象。整的审查预计将在科学委员会第六十三届年度会议(2016 年 6 月 27 日至 7 月 1 日)上被核准出版，并设想在 2016 年年底之前可付印。
以上文字——原文——摘摘自2016年联合国第71次会议的《使用贫铀武器弹药的影响-秘书长的报告》中文版，报告编号A/71/139。
联合国有没有把贫铀弹纳入禁用武器之列
联合国关于贫铀武器的相关决议
从2007年第62届联合国大会到今天的第77届联合国大会，关于贫铀武器总共出台了9个主要决议。
具体如下：
- 2022年第77届会议77/49号决议（编号A/RES/77/49）“全面彻底裁军：使用贫铀武器弹药的影响”
- 2020年第75届会议77/42号决议（编号A/RES/75/42）“全面彻底裁军：使用贫铀武器弹药的影响”
- 2018年第73届会议73/38号决议（编号A/RES/73/38）“全面彻底裁军：使用贫铀武器弹药的影响”
- 2016年第71届会议71/70号决议（编号A/RES/71/70）“全面彻底裁军：使用贫铀武器弹药的影响”
- 2014年第69届会议69/57号决议（编号A/RES/69/57）“全面彻底裁军：使用贫铀武器弹药的影响”
- 2012年第67届会议67/36号决议（编号A/RES/67/36）“全面彻底裁军：使用贫铀武器弹药的影响”
- 2010年第65届会议65/55号决议（编号A/RES/65/55）“全面彻底裁军：使用贫铀武器弹药的影响”
- 2008年第63届会议63/54号决议（编号A/RES/63/54 ）“全面彻底裁军：使用贫铀武器弹药的影响”
- 2007年第62届会议62/30号决议（编号A/RES/62/30 ）“全面彻底裁军：使用贫铀武器弹药的影响”
这全部9个决议我都看过了，它们的结论都一样：
“亟需酌情执行国际原子能机构、联合国环境规划署和世界卫生组织的建议，以减少贫铀残余物污染区域给人和环境造成的潜在危害”
“有关国际组织迄今开展的研究没有足够详细地说明使用贫铀武器弹药对人和环境的潜在长期影响的严重程度”
“请秘书长请有关国际组织酌情更新和完成其有关使用贫铀武器弹药对人类健康和环境的影响的调查和研究”
“决定在大会下一届会议临时议程题为‘全面彻底裁军’的项目下列入题为‘使用贫铀武器弹药的影响’的分项”
以上文字——原文——摘自这些决议的中文版。
因篇幅有限，各决议原文这里不再引用，感兴趣的朋友可根据决议编号到联合国官网自查。
另附两个联合国环境规划署报告
- 波黑战后关于贫铀的环境评估报告/Depleted Uranium in Bosnia and Herzegovina Post-Conflict Environmental Assessment
- 科索沃战后关于贫铀的环境评估报告/Depleted Uranium in Kosovo Post-Conflict Environmental Assessment
联合国环境规划署“波黑战后关于贫铀的环境评估报告/Depleted Uranium in Bosnia and Herzegovina Post-Conflict Environmental Assessment”——原文链接见注释[2]
这个报告太长了，总共303页——链接见文末。
我只把其中“第5章节 结论/5. Conclusions”部分拿出来机翻一下。
Based on the findings discussed in Chapter 4 (and on a site-specific basis in Chapter 7), the overall conclusions of the UNEP mission are as follows: 1) Investigated sites: a) The UNEP team visited 15 sites of which one of the NATO-confirmed sites was inaccessible due to the presence of mines (76 mm AT Self-Prop Gun). Three of the 14 sites investigated clearly showed DU contamination, confirming the earlier use of DU ordnance (i.e. in Hadzici both the former Tank Repair Facility and Ammunition Storage Depot, and Han Pijesak Artillery Storage and Barracks). These sites corresponded to confirmed NATO coordinates. Importantly, there are six NATO coordinates in the vicinity of Sarajevo which are still missing. These sites could therefore not be investigated. b) No DU contamination was found on the other 11 sites investigated. Based on the information collected in the field and subsequent laboratory work, it is highly unlikely that DU would have been used at these sites. Even if there had been a full clean-up of the sites following the attacks, analytical methods would have detected traces of DU in the soil, water and/or biota samples. 2) Localized ground contamination: None of the sites showed signs of widespread contamination of the ground surface as nothing was detected by portable beta and gamma radiation detectors. At most, localized ground contamination was detected around contamination points at distances below 200 m, but often much closer, as confirmed by the much more sensitive laboratory analy ses of soil samples. This also indicates that most DU rounds probably never fragmented but penetrated into the ground. When penetrators enter ground that is more or less soft, significantly less DU dust results. The corresponding radiological and toxicological risks from such low-level contamination are insignificant. These observations are consistent with the findings from UNEP’s two previous assessments. 3) Contamination points: a) Over seven years had elapsed since the military conflict and UNEP’s assessment mission. In 2000-2001, other international expert teams had searched many of the sites investigated by UNEP for penetrators and contamination points. Despite this, many penetrators and contamination points were still found and identified by UNEP. Ground surface DU contamination that is detectable by portable beta and gamma radiation detectors was typically limited to areas within 1-2 m of penetrators and localized points of contamination caused by penetrator impacts. Almost 300 contamination points were identified during the mission, but most of them were only slightly contaminated. Each was marked for the authorities to address. 根据第4章中讨论的调查结果（以及第7章中针对具体地点的调查结果），环境署代表团的总体结论如下： 1） 调查地点： a） 环境规划署小组访问了15个地点，其中一个北约确认的地点由于存在地雷（76毫米AT自行火炮）而无法进入。在调查的14个地点中，有三个清楚地显示出贫铀污染，证实了贫铀弹药的早期使用（即在哈齐奇的前坦克修理厂和弹药储存库，以及Han Pijesak炮兵储存和兵营）。这些地点与已确认的北约坐标相对应。重要的是，萨拉热窝附近有六个北约坐标仍然下落不明。因此，无法对这些地点进行调查。 b） 在调查的其他11个地点未发现DU污染。根据现场收集的信息和随后的实验室工作，DU极不可能在这些地点使用。即使在袭击发生后对现场进行了全面清理，分析方法也会在土壤、水和/或生物群样本中检测到DU的痕迹。 2） 局部地面污染： 由于便携式β和γ辐射探测器没有检测到任何迹象，因此没有一个地点显示出地面受到广泛污染的迹象。大多数情况下，在200米以下的污染点周围检测到局部地面污染，但通常要近得多，正如更敏感的土壤样本实验室分析所证实的那样。这也表明，大多数贫铀弹可能从未碎裂，而是深入地面。当穿透器进入或多或少柔软的地面时，产生的DU粉尘会明显减少。这种低水平污染所带来的相应放射性和毒理学风险是微不足道的。这些观察结果与环境署先前两次评估的结果一致。 3） 污染点： a） 自军事冲突和环境署的评估任务以来，已经过去了七年多。2000-2001年，其他国际专家小组在环境规划署调查的许多地点搜索了穿透器和污染点。尽管如此，环境规划署仍然发现并确定了许多穿透器和污染点。 便携式β和γ辐射探测器可检测到的地表DU污染通常局限于穿透器1-2m范围内的区域和穿透器撞击造成的局部污染点。在执行任务期间，确定了近300个污染点，但其中大多数仅受到轻微污染。每一个都有标记，供当局处理。 b) Based on results of air filter measurements, contamination points may be formed by resuspension of DU particles in the air. However, no significant risk is expected to arise from these points through inhalation by local populations or possible contamination of water or plants. c) The only risk of any potential significance would be through touching a contamination point, thereby contaminating the body (with a risk of subsequent transfer to the mouth), or directly ingesting contaminated soil. However, with reasonable assumptions on intake of soil, the corresponding radiological risk would be insignificant, while from a toxicological point of view the possible intake might be somewhat higher than applicable health standards or guidelines. 4) Penetrators and fragments: a) During the mission three penetrators were collected for detailed analysis. There were also indications from field measurements of a large number hidden in the ground (contamination points). At the former Hadzici Tank Repair Facility, an unknown number of penetrators had been collected by both locals and SFOR troops. Given that several thousand DU rounds were reportedly fired against the target sites investigated, the number found is still low. It is concluded that there could be four possible explanations: • the majority of the penetrators are buried deep in the ground; • they are spread over larger, inaccessible areas within mine fields; • they have been removed during random site clean-up or during mine clearing activities; • they have been removed in circumstances beyond the control of the authorities (for instance by local people) The most probable and most widely applicable explanation is the first one, but the other three scenarios might also have occurred. b) Penetrator corrosion: Corrosion occurs relatively quickly when the penetrator remains in the ground and is surrounded by soil. A penetrator can be completely corroded to emitting corrosion products (e.g. uranium oxides and carbonates) in the 25-35 years following impact. These corrosion products may in turn dissolve and disperse in water. However, the rate of corrosion depends on the composition of the soil. If the penetrator is lying on the ground surface the corrosion rate is significantly lower. c) Penetrator contact: The corroded uranium is loosely attached and easily removable. Consequently, if such a penetrator is picked up, it could easily contaminate anyone handling it. Even if the probable resulting intake into the body is small, the radiological and toxicological risks should not be ignored. If a penetrator is placed near the body, such as in a pocket, there will be external beta radiation to the skin. After some weeks of continuous exposure, this could lead to localized radiation doses above safety standards. Even so, it is unlikely that there would be any adverse health effects from such exposure. d) Accidental penetrator recovery: Buried penetrators and jackets may be accidentally brought to the surface in the future through digging as part of soil removal or construction works. The corresponding risks would then be the same as for penetrators and jackets currently lying on the surface. e) Penetrator composition: The transuranic elements plutonium-239/240 and neptunium-237, as well as the uranium isotope U-236, were found to be present in the depleted uranium of those penetrators analysed. However, the concentrations were very low, in the published range of the open military literature, and did not have any significant impact on their overall radioactivity or health risk. The composition is consistent with penetrators found in earlier assessments. b） 根据空气过滤器的测量结果，空气中DU颗粒的再悬浮可能会形成污染点。然而，预计这些点不会因当地人群吸入或可能吸入而产生重大风险 水或植物的污染。 c） 唯一具有潜在意义的风险是接触污染点，从而污染身体（有随后转移到口腔的风险），或直接摄入受污染的土壤。然而，在对土壤摄入量进行合理假设的情况下，相应的放射性风险将微不足道，而从毒理学的角度来看，可能的摄入量可能略高于适用的健康标准或指南。 4） 渗透剂和碎片： a） 在执行任务期间，收集了三个穿透器进行详细分析。现场测量也显示有大量隐藏在地下（污染点）。在前Hadzici坦克修理厂，当地人和稳定部队都收集了数量不详的穿透弹。鉴于据报道向调查的目标地点发射了数千发贫铀弹，发现的数量仍然很低。得出的结论是，可能有四种可能的解释： •大多数穿透器埋在地下深处； •它们分布在矿区内更大、人迹罕至的地区； •在随机清理现场或排雷活动期间，它们已被清除； •在当局无法控制的情况下（例如，被当地人）将其移除 最可能和最广泛适用的解释是第一种，但其他三种情况也可能发生。 b） 穿透器腐蚀：当穿透器留在地面并被土壤包围时，腐蚀发生得相对较快。穿透器可以在撞击后的25-35年内被完全腐蚀，产生腐蚀产物（如铀氧化物和碳酸盐）。这些腐蚀产物反过来可能会溶解并分散在水中。然而，腐蚀速率取决于土壤的成分。如果穿透器位于地面上，则腐蚀速率明显较低。 c） 渗透器接触：被腐蚀的铀附着松散，易于移除。 因此，如果拿起这样的穿透器，它很容易污染任何使用它的人。即使可能导致的人体摄入量很小，也不应忽视辐射和毒理学风险。如果将穿透器放在身体附近，例如放在口袋里，皮肤会受到外部β辐射。在连续暴露数周后，这可能导致局部辐射剂量超过安全标准。即便如此，这种接触也不太可能对健康产生任何不利影响。 d） 意外的穿透器回收：作为土壤清除或建筑工程的一部分，埋设的穿透器和导管架可能在未来通过挖掘意外地被带到地表。相应的风险将与目前位于地表上的穿透器和导管架相同。 e） 穿透剂成分：在分析的穿透剂的贫铀中发现了超铀元素钚-239/240和镎-237，以及铀同位素U-236。然而，在公开的军事文献中，这些浓度非常低，对其总体放射性或健康风险没有任何重大影响。成分与早期评估中发现的穿透剂一致。 5) Soil contamination: The contamination of subsurface soil above and below penetrators was studied. The penetrators lay in undisturbed, grass covered ground at a depth of 3-8 cm below the soil surface. Soil contamination around the penetrator was 45 g of DU per kg of soil. Within 10 cm below the penetrator the DU concentration decreased by two orders of magnitude, and within the next 30 cm by a further three orders of magnitude. From these observations it is concluded that the mobility of corroded DU in the present soil composition is low due to the fact that it is retarded by sorption and coprecipitation with minerals. Groundwater contamination is unlikely due to the low mobility of DU corrosion products. 6) Water contamination: a) DU could be clearly identified in one of the drinking water samples. A second drinking water sample from a well showed traces of DU contamination, which were detectable only through the use of mass spectrometric measurements. The concentrations are very low and the corresponding radiation doses are insignificant for any health risk. This is also the case with respect to toxicity of uranium as a heavy metal. However, because the mechanism that governs the contamination of water in a given environment is not known in detail, it is concluded that water sampling and measurements should continue for several years. b) As concluded above, it is probable that the majority of penetrators are hidden in the ground. They may constitute a risk of future groundwater and drinking water contamination where they lie close to water sources, as is the case for those samples indicating contamination (i.e. the wells were most likely lying in the line of attack). Although DU mobility is low, if a penetrator is located in the immediate vicinity of a water source, contamination may occur. Heavy firing of DU in an area could increase the potential source of uranium contamination of groundwater by a factor of 10 to 100, compared to the case of a single penetrator. While the radiation doses will be low, the resulting uranium concentration may exceed WHO health standards or guidelines for drinking water. 7) Bio-indicator contamination: The presence of DU was found in lichen samples at the three sites mentioned above. This is an indication that some penetrators hit targets and hard surfaces, partly split into dust and dispersed into the air. This also illustrates that analysis of lichen samples is a useful method in monitoring the quality of the environment. 8) Vegetable samples: Two vegetable samples (cabbage) were taken in the vicinity of the former Hadzici Tank Repair Facility. Results from these two samples are insufficient to allow for any scientific conclusion. There are no reasons to expect any DU in food due to the low dispersion rate in the ground and low uptake factor in food. 9) Air contamination: a) DU contamination of air was found at two sites where DU use had been confirmed. This can be due to resuspension of DU particles by wind or human activities from contamination points, corroded penetrators or fragments lying on the surface. The concentrations were very low and resulting radiation doses were minor and insignificant. At distances over 100 m from contaminated areas, no DU could be detected in the air. This may be due to limits on instrumentation detection. b) DU contamination of air and some surfaces was found inside two buildings at the two sites mentioned above. This can be due to resuspension of DU particles by wind or human activities from contamination points, corroded penetrators or fragments laying on the surface inside, as well as any DU dust contained within the building since the time of attack. Although the low levels measured result in doses which are minor and insignificant, UNEP considers exposure to such a source unnecessary. Therefore, precautionary clean-up steps for areas of contamination are recommended. 5） 土壤污染： 对穿透器上方和下方的地下土壤污染进行了研究。穿透器位于土壤表面以下3-8厘米的未受干扰的草地上。穿透器周围的土壤污染为每千克土壤45克DU。在穿透器下方10厘米内，DU浓度下降了两个数量级，在接下来的30厘米内又下降了三个数量级。从这些观察结果可以得出结论，在目前的土壤成分中，被腐蚀的DU的迁移率很低，因为它被与矿物的吸附和共沉淀所阻碍。 由于DU腐蚀产物的流动性较低，地下水不太可能受到污染。 6） 水污染： a） 在其中一个饮用水样本中可以清楚地识别出DU。来自一口井的第二个饮用水样本显示出DU污染的痕迹，只有通过质谱测量才能检测到。浓度非常低，相应的辐射剂量对任何健康风险都无关紧要。 铀作为一种重金属的毒性也是如此。然而，由于在特定环境中控制水污染的机制尚不详细，因此得出的结论是，水的采样和测量应持续几年。 b） 如上所述，大多数穿透器很可能隐藏在地下。它们可能会在靠近水源的地方构成未来地下水和饮用水污染的风险，表明受到污染的样本也是如此（即水井最有可能位于攻击线）。尽管DU的迁移率很低，但如果穿透器位于水源附近，可能会发生污染。与单个穿透器的情况相比，在一个地区大量发射贫铀可能会使地下水中铀污染的潜在来源增加10到100倍。虽然辐射剂量较低，但由此产生的铀浓度可能超过世界卫生组织的健康标准或饮用水指南。 7） 生物指示剂污染： 在上述三个地点的地衣样本中发现了DU的存在。 这表明一些穿透器击中目标和坚硬表面，部分分裂成灰尘并分散到空气中。这也说明地衣样本的分析是监测环境质量的一种有用方法。 8） 蔬菜样品： 在前Hadzici储罐维修设施附近采集了两份蔬菜样本（卷心菜）。这两个样本的结果不足以得出任何科学结论。由于在地面中的低分散率和食物中的低吸收因子，没有理由期望食物中有任何DU。 9） 空气污染： a） 在已经确认使用贫铀的两个地点发现了空气中的贫铀污染。 这可能是由于风或人类活动使DU颗粒从污染点、腐蚀的穿透器或表面碎片中重新悬浮所致。浓度非常低，由此产生的辐射剂量很小且微不足道。 在距离污染区100米以上的地方，空气中无法检测到DU。 这可能是由于对仪器检测的限制。 b） 在上述两个地点的两栋建筑内发现了空气和一些表面的DU污染。这可能是由于风或人类活动使DU颗粒从污染点、腐蚀的穿透器或内部表面上的碎片，以及自袭击以来建筑物内包含的任何DU灰尘中重新悬浮。尽管所测得的低水平导致剂量较小且微不足道，但环境署认为接触这种来源是不必要的。因此，建议对污染区域采取预防性清理措施。 10) Awareness raising: Throughout the mission, UNEP observed that workers and civilians with access to these sites, as well as military and mine clearing personnel, were unaware of or misunderstood the risks and issues with respect to DU ammunition in general. 11) Methodology: The techniques, equipment and methodologies used worked very well during the mission and the experience from earlier missions contributed to the successful evaluations. 12) Radiation protection and radiation safety: a) The radiation safety infrastructure in BiH has only recently been established. In the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH), the new Law on Radiation Protection and Radiation Safety establishing the basis for the new regulatory system was approved by Parliament in 1999. In the Republika Srpska (RS), legislation complying with the IAEA’s international standards for protection against ionizing radiation was adopted in 2001. The efforts made in establishing an institutional radiation protection framework in BiH since the end of the conflict are commendable, considering the limited resources available and the encouraging results achieved, although more work is necessary to improve radiation protection. b) In addition to two independent legal frameworks for radiation protection, two separate regulatory authorities and radiation protection organizations have been created in the FBiH and RS. This results in a duplication of services and activities which is particularly inappropriate in view of the shortage of resources available. The lack of cooperation between the two radiation protection organizations negatively affects the establishment and implementation of an efficient radiation safety regime in BiH. c) The low-level radioactive waste repository of the FBiH provides an adequate facility for the safe storage of radioactive waste in the territory, including depleted uranium residues. Work on the construction of a treatment and conditioning facility for the radioactive waste has started, although no significant progress has been made in the last year. The treatment facility will improve the capability for the Centre for Radiation Protection to deal with radioactive waste. Unfortunately, no repository for low-level radioactive waste is operational in Republika Srpska, although progress has been made towards identifying a possible location where the repository could be built. d) There were a significant number of radioactive sources, such as industrial sources, lightning rods and smoke detectors, in use throughout BiH before the war. Records for these are no longer available. Many of these sources have become obsolete or were lost or damaged during the war and have yet to be recovered. The risks from potential exposure to them are significantly higher than those from exposure to DU residues. Consideration should be given to the storage and eventual disposal of these sources and in particular to those which were lost or damaged during the war. e) While normal environmental monitoring is not a high priority for BiH, where there are no significant sources of radioactive discharges from facilities, it is of concern that no activities are carried out to ensure the protection of members of the public in areas accessible to them and where radiation and/or risks from contamination may exist. This concerns particularly those areas where damaged or abandoned and uncontrolled sources may exist as a result of the disruption caused by the war. 10） 提高认识： 在整个访问过程中，环境署观察到，能够进入这些地点的工人和平民，以及军事和扫雷人员，不知道或误解了贫铀弹药的总体风险和问题。 11） 方法： 特派团期间使用的技术、设备和方法非常有效，早期特派团的经验有助于成功进行评价。 12） 辐射防护和辐射安全： a） 波黑的辐射安全基础设施是最近才建立起来的。在波斯尼亚和黑塞哥维那联邦，议会于1999年批准了新的《辐射防护和辐射安全法》，为新的监管制度奠定了基础。在塞族共和国，2001年通过了符合原子能机构电离辐射防护国际标准的立法。考虑到可用资源有限和取得的令人鼓舞的成果，尽管需要做更多的工作来改善辐射防护，但自冲突结束以来，波黑在建立辐射防护体制框架方面所做的努力值得赞扬。 b） 除了两个独立的辐射保护法律框架外，在波黑联邦和RS还设立了两个单独的监管机构和辐射保护组织。这导致了服务和活动的重复，鉴于可用资源短缺，这是特别不合适的。两个辐射保护组织之间缺乏合作，对波黑建立和实施有效的辐射安全制度产生了负面影响。 c） 波黑联邦的低放射性废物储存库为在该领土安全储存包括贫铀残留物在内的放射性废物提供了充足的设施。放射性废物处理和调节设施的建设工作已经开始，尽管去年没有取得重大进展。该处理设施将提高辐射防护中心处理放射性废物的能力。不幸的是，塞族共和国没有低放射性废物储存库，尽管在确定可能的储存库建设地点方面取得了进展。 d） 战前，波黑各地都在使用大量放射源，如工业源、避雷针和烟雾探测器。这些记录已不可用。这些来源中的许多已经过时，或者在战争中丢失或损坏，至今尚未恢复。潜在暴露于DU的风险明显高于暴露于DU残留物的风险。应考虑这些来源的储存和最终处置，特别是那些在战争中丢失或损坏的来源。 e） 虽然对波黑来说，正常的环境监测并不是一个高度优先事项，因为那里的设施没有重大的放射性排放源，但令人关切的是，没有开展任何活动来确保在公众可以进入的地区以及可能存在辐射和/或污染风险的地区保护公众。 这尤其涉及那些由于战争造成的破坏而可能存在受损或废弃和不受控制的来源的地区。 13) Health concerns: Due to the lack of a proper cancer registry and reporting system, claims of an increase in the rates of adverse health effects stemming from DU cannot be substantiated. It is encouraging that the BiH authorities are in the process of implementing a registry and reporting system to detect and report cancers within the country. This should allow the verification of concerns about changes in the frequency of cancers. The scientific data on uranium and DU health effects developed over the last half century, and the extremely low exposure identified in this UNEP mission, indicates that it is highly unlikely that DU could be associated with any of these reported health effects. 14) DU box: One of UNEP’s tasks was to investigate the history and location of the box containing DU penetrators, fragments and jackets/casings originally located at the former Hadzici Tank Repair Facility (see Chapter 7.1). Based on a NATO fax dated 3 December 2002, the box containing DU material was transferred in spring 2001 to US national facilities outside Bosnia and Herzegovina for disposal. 15) Heavy metals: At three of the sites investigated, high surface contamination of heavy metals was measured (Vogosca’s Ammunition Production Facility, and ammunition destruction sites at Kalinovik and the Bjelasnica Plateau). Such contamination could represent a potential future health risk. As the intervention values for certain elements in soil have already been reached, further investigation is required to properly assess the situation. 13） 健康问题： 由于缺乏适当的癌症登记和报告系统，关于DU引起的不良健康影响率增加的说法无法得到证实。令人鼓舞的是，波黑当局正在实施一个登记和报告系统，以在国内检测和报告癌症。这应该可以验证人们对癌症发生频率变化的担忧。过去半个世纪发展起来的关于铀和贫铀对健康影响的科学数据，以及环境署这次访问中确定的极低暴露量，表明贫铀极不可能与这些报告的健康影响中的任何一种有关。 14） DU盒： 环境规划署的任务之一是调查最初位于前哈齐奇坦克修理厂的装有贫铀穿透器、碎片和护套/套管的盒子的历史和位置（见第7.1章）。根据北约2002年12月3日的传真，装有贫铀材料的盒子于2001年春被转移到波斯尼亚和黑塞哥维那以外的美国国家设施进行处理。 15） 重金属： 在调查的三个地点，测量到重金属的高表面污染（Vogosca的弹药生产设施，以及Kalinovik和Bjelasnica高原的弹药销毁地点）。这种污染可能代表未来潜在的健康风险。由于土壤中某些元素的干预值已经达到，因此需要进一步调查以正确评估情况。
联合国环境规划署“科索沃战后关于贫铀的环境评估报告/Depleted Uranium in Kosovo Post-Conflict Environmental Assessment”——原文链接见注释[3]
这报告188页，依然只看“结论”部分。
(a) The conclusions and observations in this section refer to the UNEP mission to Kosovo from 5 – 19 November 2000, and to the 11 sites that were visited and investigated at that time. Because of the risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance, the investigated sites were limited in extent when compared with the total area potentially affected by the use of DU in Kosovo. Nevertheless, the results from the 11 sites studied are at least indicative for other affected areas. The mission made a number of important new findings and acquired a variety of experience that will be of value in planning and implementing further work. (b) A ‘significant’ radiological risk is one where the expected radiation dose would be > 1 mSv per event, or per year. A ‘significant’ toxicological risk means that the expected concentration or intake would exceed WHO health standards. ‘Insignificant’ radiological or toxicological risks are those where the corresponding dose or concentrations/intakes are < 1mSv, or below WHO health standards, respectively. (c) Based on the findings discussed above in section 4 (and on a site-by-site basis in section 7), the overall conclusions of the UNEP mission are as follows: 1. There was no detectable, widespread contamination of the ground surface by depleted uranium. This means that any widespread contamination is present in such low levels that it cannot be detected or differentiated from the natural uranium concentration found in rocks and soil. The corresponding radiological and toxicological risks are insignificant and even non-existent. 2. Detectable ground surface contamination by DU is limited to areas within a few metres of penetrators and localised points of concentrated contamination (‘contamination points’) caused by penetrator impacts. A number of contamination points were identified by the mission but most of these were found to be only slightly contaminated. The majority of the radioactivity was attached to the surrounding asphalt, concrete or soil, with some attached to the loose sand present in some penetrator holes. In many cases, the radioactivity was so low that it was hardly detectable. 3. There is no significant risk related to these contamination points in terms of possible contamination of air, water or plants. The only risk of any significance would be that someone touched the contamination point, thereby contaminating their hands (with a risk of subsequent transfer to the mouth), or directly ingested the contaminated soil. However, with reasonable assumptions on intake of soil, the corresponding radiological risk would be insignificant, while from a toxicological point of view, the possible intake might be somewhat higher than the applicable health standards. 4. No DU-contaminated water, milk, objects, or buildings were found. 5. Seven and a half penetrators and six jackets were found during the two-week mission. The fact that no more were found, despite intensive searching, may imply that: – other penetrators are not on the surface but buried in the ground; – they are spread over a larger area than assumed; – they have already been picked up, for instance during military site clean-up or mine clearance. （a） 本节的结论和意见涉及2000年11月5日至19日环境署对科索沃的访问，以及当时访问和调查的11个地点。由于地雷和未爆弹药带来的风险，与科索沃使用贫铀可能影响的总面积相比，调查地点的范围有限。尽管如此，研究的11个地点的结果至少对其他受影响地区具有指示性。访问团提出了一些重要的新发现，并获得了各种经验，这些经验将对规划和实施进一步的工作具有价值。 （b） “重大”放射性风险是指每次事件或每年的预期辐射剂量将>1 mSv。“重大”毒理学风险意味着预期浓度或摄入量将超过世界卫生组织的健康标准。”“无关紧要的”放射性或毒理学风险是指相应剂量或浓度/摄入量分别小于1mSv或低于世界卫生组织健康标准的风险。 （c） 根据上文第4节中讨论的调查结果（以及第7节中逐个地点的调查结果），环境署特派团的总体结论如下： 1.没有发现贫铀对地面造成可探测到的广泛污染。这意味着，任何广泛的污染都存在于如此低的水平，以至于无法检测到，也无法与岩石和土壤中发现的天然铀浓度区分开来。相应的放射性和毒理学风险微不足道，甚至根本不存在。 2.DU可检测的地表污染仅限于穿透器几米范围内的区域和穿透器撞击造成的局部集中污染点（“接触点”）。特派团确定了一些污染点，但发现其中大多数仅受轻微污染。大部分放射性物质附着在周围的沥青、混凝土或土壤上，有些附着在一些穿透器孔中的松散沙子上。在许多情况下，放射性很低，几乎无法检测到。 3.就空气、水或植物可能受到的污染而言，这些污染点没有重大风险。唯一有意义的风险是，有人触摸了污染点，从而污染了他们的手（有可能随后转移到嘴里），或者直接摄入了受污染的土壤。然而，在对土壤摄入量进行合理假设的情况下，相应的放射性风险将微不足道，而从毒理学的角度来看，可能的摄入量可能略高于适用的健康标准。 4.未发现DU污染的水、牛奶、物体或建筑物。 5.在为期两周的任务中发现了七个半穿透器和六个夹克。尽管进行了密集的搜索，但没有发现更多的线索，这可能意味着： –其他穿透器不在地表，而是埋在地下； –它们分布在比假设更大的区域； ——例如，在军事现场清理或排雷期间，它们已经被捡走了。 6. There are probably still penetrators lying on the ground surface. If picked up they could contaminate hands. However, the probable intake into the body is small and both the radiological and toxicological risks are likely to be insignificant. 7. If a penetrator is put into the pocket or elsewhere close to the human body, there will be external beta radiation of the skin. That can lead to local radiation doses above safety standards after some weeks of continuous exposure. Even so, it is unlikely that there will be any adverse health effects from such an exposure. 8. Penetrators oxidise and the outermost layer of the surface of the penetrator can then be removed easily and thereby contaminate its surroundings. Some DU has dispersed into the ground beneath penetrators and jackets lying on the surface and is measurable to a depth of 10 – 20 cm. 9. It is probable that many penetrators and jackets are hidden at some metres depth in the ground. These penetrators and jackets as well as those on the ground surface, constitute a risk of future DU contamination of groundwater and drinking water. Heavy firing of DU in one area could increase the potential source of uranium contamination of groundwater by a factor of 10 to 100. While the radiation doses will be very low, the resulting uranium concentration might exceed WHO health standards for drinking water. 10. However, there are too many uncertainties to predict the future levels of groundwater contamination with any reliability. To reduce these uncertainties, it would be valuable to undertake a mission to areas where DU was used at an earlier time than in Kosovo, e.g. Bosnia-Herzegovina where buried or surface DU ordnance has persisted in the environment for 5 – 6 years. 11. Hidden penetrators and jackets may be dug up to the ground surface in the 5Conclusions future. The corresponding risks are then the same as for penetrators and jackets now lying on the surface. 12. The uranium isotope U-236 and the plutonium isotopes Pu-239/240 were present in the depleted uranium of those penetrators analysed in very small concentrations and do not pose a significant risk. 13. There are signs that some plant material, such as lichen, and possibly bark, may be good environmental indicators of DU. The preliminary results should be verified by additional analysis. 14. The sites visited by the UNEP mission represent some 12% of all sites attacked using DU ammunition during the Kosovo conflict. Based on the mission’s findings, it is possible to make certain extrapolations for other DU-affected sites in Kosovo, but also for sites in Serbia (about 10% of sites targeted with DU) and Montenegro (amounting to approximately 2% of sites targeted with DU), where there are similar circumstances and environmental conditions, and which had been targeted by DU ammunition during the same conflict. However, further work would be needed to confirm the validity of such extrapolations. 6.地面上可能仍有穿透器。如果被捡起来，它们可能会污染手。然而，摄入人体的可能性很小，放射性和毒理学风险可能都很小。 7.如果将穿透器放入口袋或靠近人体的其他地方，皮肤会受到外部β辐射。在连续暴露数周后，这可能导致局部辐射剂量超过安全标准。即便如此，这种接触也不太可能对健康产生任何不利影响。 8.渗透剂会氧化，然后可以很容易地去除渗透剂表面的最外层，从而污染其周围环境。一些DU已经扩散到地表穿透器和导管架下方的地面中，可以测量到10-20厘米的深度。 9.许多穿透器和导管架可能隐藏在地下几米深的地方。这些穿透器和导管架以及地面上的穿透器和套管构成了未来DU污染地下水和饮用水的风险。在一个地区大量发射贫铀可能会使地下水中铀污染的潜在来源增加10到100倍。虽然辐射剂量很低，但由此产生的铀浓度可能超过世界卫生组织饮用水的健康标准。 10.然而，有太多的不确定性，无法可靠地预测未来的地下水污染水平。为了减少这些不确定性，派遣一个特派团前往比科索沃更早使用贫铀的地区是很有价值的，例如波斯尼亚和黑塞哥维那，那里的掩埋或地表贫铀弹药在环境中持续存在了5-6年。 11.隐蔽的穿透器和导管架可以挖到5地下室的地面将来相应的风险与现在躺在地面上的穿透器和导管架的风险相同。 12.铀同位素U-236和钚同位素Pu-239/240存在于这些穿透器的贫铀中，分析浓度很低，不会造成重大风险。 13.有迹象表明，一些植物材料，如地衣，可能还有树皮，可能是DU的良好环境指标。初步结果应通过额外的分析进行验证。 14.联合国环境规划署特派团访问的地点约占科索沃冲突期间使用贫铀弹药袭击的所有地点的12%。根据调查团的调查结果，可以对科索沃其他受贫铀影响的地点进行某些推断，也可以对塞尔维亚（约占贫铀目标地点的10%）和黑山（约占目标地点的2%）的地点进行推断，因为这些地点有类似的情况和环境条件，在同一次冲突中被贫铀弹药瞄准。然而，还需要进一步的工作来证实这种推断的有效性。
